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ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
LENNART

VERNON LARSON

(Continued from January)
Quo WAMZANTO
The function of the information in the nature of quo warranto, so
far as it bears upon acts of administrative tribunals, may be seen in
the following statutes:
Rxim. REv. STAT. § 1034. An information may be filed
against any person or corporation in the following cases:
1. When any person shall usurp, intrude into, or
unlawfully hold or exercise any public office or
franchise within the state, or any office in any corporation created by the authority of the state;
2. When any public officer shall have done or
suffered any act, which, by the provisions of law,
shall work a forfeiture of his office ....
Section 1043. Whenever any defendant shall be found
guilty of any unsurpation of or intrusion into or unlawfully
exercising any office or franchise within this state, or any
office in any corporation created by the authority of this state,
or when any public officer thus charged shall be found guilty
of having done or suffered any act which by the provisions
of the law shall work a forfeiture of his office . . . the
court shall give judgment of ouster against the defendafit or
defendants, and exclude him or them from the office, franchise, or corporate rights, . . . and the court shall adjudge
costs in favor of the plaintiff.
The statutes" governing the proceeding have remained unaltered,
except for minor changes, since first enacted as territorial laws in 1854.
The historical development, theory, and practice concerning the
information in Washington were the subject of a comprehensive article
in this REvIw five years ago.95 The statutory proceeding is related to
the ancient writ of quo warranto and to the common law information
in the nature of quo warranto. More particularly does it have relation
to the latter, as modified by English legislation in 1710. The Washington
Constitution gives the supreme court "original jurisdiction in . .. quo
"IRtE. liEV. STAT. §§ 1034-1048. Cf. Laws 1854, pp. 216-218. Section 1047
should be noticed as authorizing prosecution of the information 'for the
purpose of annulling or vacating any letters patent, certificate, or deed
granted by the proper authorities of this state when there is reason to
believe the same were obtained by fraud, or through mistake or ignorance
of a material fact, or when the patentee or those claiming under him
have done or omitted an act in violation of the terms on which the letters,
deeds or certificates were granted, or have by any other means forfeited
the interests acquired under the same."

'9Orloff, Information in the Nature of Quo Warranto in the State of
Washington, 15 WAEE. L. REV. 165 (1940).
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as to all state officers" and empowers the superior courts

to issue "writs of . . .quo warranto." 98 A technical question may be
raised whether or not the supreme court, or the superior courts, or both,
are limited to issuance of the common law writ, as distinguished from the
information. But the terms "writ" and "information" have been used
loosely and interchangeably in modern times, and the courts undoubtedlyly have all the jurisdiction exercised at common law under the writ
and information. The statute seems to govern the proceeding both in the
supreme and superior courts, and this is proper because it embodies in
substance the common law (as modified by early English legislation).
Quo warranto has been used largely in election contests, cases of
removal from office, and in disputes over civil service employment.
The proceeding is one in which both questions of law and of fact may
be decided. The litigants have no right to a jury trial,9 7 and the
judge, in proper cases, has full power to make findings of fact.
According to REm. Rxv. STAT. Section 1014, mandamus may issue
"to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded."
From this language one may conclude that the
writs of mandamus and quo warranto overlap. The Washington court
has made the following pronouncement concerning the functions of the
two writs:
"This court has many times held that, wherever the title
to an office, or the right to it, is involved, and where it
is necessary to determine from facts outside the pleadings
as to who is entitled to the office, mandamus is not the proper
remedy, but that the person claiming the office must resort to
quo warranto....
"There are at least two Washington cases holding mandamus
to be the proper remedy to restore civil service employees to
their positions where it is claimed that they have been improperly removed. ....The only means by which these apparently irreconcilable creatures can be turned into one cage
where they will lie in cordial intercourse, without dealing a
death blow to one or the other species, is to reconcile them
by holding that mandamus is the remedy by which to reacquire a position of an employee, while quo warranto is the
remedy by which to determine the right or title to an office by
an official." 8
The rule that title to an office, other than one under civil service
regulation, must be tried in quo warranto proceedings applies whether a

"Art. IV, §§ 4, 6. Italics supplied
9'State

v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958 (1897); State v. Fawcett,

17 Wash. 188, 49 Pac. 346 (1897).
08State v. Otis, 131 Wash. 455, 459, 230 Pac. 414, 415, 416 (1924).
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question of law or of fact is involved. 99 An early case"

granting

mandamus may be distinguished (if, indeed,-it is not overruled) in
that the mayor and council were- entirely without power to remove
plaintiff and a simple question of law was involved. Mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to try one's right to employment under a civil
service law.' 0' But quo warranto may also be used if the employment
in question is an "office."' 102 That is, the employment must be above
that of common laborer, must be distinctly classified, and must be
"permanent" in nature. Mandamus and quo warranto have a common
function in trying title to an office under civil service. As to all
other offices quo warranto must be used; mandamus must be used
as to civil service jobs which are not offices.
In general, courts have no jurisdiction over election contests
03
except in so far as specific provision therefor is made by statute.
But the statutory proceeding in quo warranto enables a contestant to
challenge the right of another who has assumed an office. In many
instances where special statutes providing for election contests in
court have been held inapplicable, the statutory information has
proved an adequate remedy. Where an election is challenged in quo
warranto proceedings, a full trial of the facts and law is had. 04 The
certification of the election board has been held to be at most only
prima facie correct. The language of the quo warranto statute is
regarded as giving plenary jurisdiction to the superior court to try
99
Lynde v. Dibble, 19 Wash. 328, 53 Pac. 370 (1898); Kimball v. Olmsted,
20 Wash. 629, 56 Pac. 377 (1899); State v. Otis, supra note 98; State v. McLennan, 110 Wash. 16, 187 Pac. 408 (1920); State v. Sailors, 164 Wash. 211,
2 P. (2d) 725 (1931); Clarken v. Blomstrom, 174 Wash. 612, 26 P.(2d) 87
(1933); State v. Tollefson, 4 Wn.(2d) 194, 103 P.(2d) 36 (1940). Cf. State v.
Cheetham, 19 Wash. 330, 53 Pac. 349 (1898); State v. Daggett, 28 Wash. 1,
68 Pac. 340 (1902); Smith v. Baughman, 194 Wash. 78, 76 P.(2d) 1022
(1938).
100 State v. Mayor of City of Ballard, 10 Wash. 4, 38 Pac. 761 (1894).
24' Cases cited notes 87-92, supra.
202 State v. Smith, 19 Wash. 644, 54 Pac. 33 (1898) (flume tender); State
v. Fassett, 69 Wash. 555, 125 Pac. 963 (1912) (construction foreman); Foster v. Hindley, 72 Wash. 657, 131 Pac. 197 (1913) (sanitary inspector);
State v. Coates, 74 Wash. 35, 132 Pac. 727 (1913) ("substreet" or "crosswalk"
foreman at $80 monthly); State v. City of Seattle, 88 Wash. 589, 153 Paa.
336 (1915) (furnace tender in garbage division not an "office").
"'Fawcett
0
v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 45 Paa. 23 (1896); Whitten
v. Silverman, 105 Wash. 238, 177 Pac. 737 (1919); Malinowski v. Tilley, 147
Wash. 405, 266 Pac. 166 (1928); Morris v. Board of County Com'rs, 195 Wash.
173, 80 P. (2d) 414 (1938); cf. State v. Fawcett and State v. Hamilton, supra
note 104.
lmm REv. STAT. §§ 5366-5382 provide for election contests concerning
county offices. See note 10, supra. An advantage of this statutory proceeding is that the right to an office may be decided prospectively. That
is, it is not necessary that the office presently be intruded upon or usurped.
201 State v. Morris, 14 Wash. 262, 44 Pac. 266 (1896); Fawcett v. Superior
Court, 15 Wash. 342, 46 Pac. 389 (1896); State v. Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49
Pac. 346 (1897); State'v. Peter, 21 Wash. 243, 57 Pac. 814 (1899); State v.
Hamilton, 118 Wash. 91, 202 Pac. 971 (1921); see Hart, op. cit. supra, note
42, p. 57, n. 5.

84
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title to an office. Perhaps another reason for the readiness of the
courts to try all questions is the convenience and ease with which
all the evidence, consisting of ballots and other papers, may be brought
into court. The determination of the election board is given little
weight and is subject to re-trial in every respect.
Disputes over the appointment or removal of an officer have often
been decided by means of the information. Legality of an appointment under a statute may be tried. 105 So also has legality of a removal
been litigated. Where the removing officer has acted according to
his statutory (or constitutional) authority, is vested with discretion,
and the removed officer has no right to a hearing, no inquiry into the
merits will be made.1" 6 Where the removing officer asserts that another
has forfeited his office but is vested with no discretionary or adjudicating power, the merits, legal and factual, will be tried in quo warranto proceedings. 107
Where removal of an officer may only take place after a hearing
and finding of cause, may quo warranto be employed to review the
merits? In State v. Van Brocklin"8 plaintiff was removed as member
of the Seattle Board of Public Works by the mayor after notice and
hearing. An action of quo warranto was instituted to review the sufficiency of the cause and evidence. On demurrer the supreme court
held one reason for dismissal sufficient in law, the other insufficient,
and remanded the case for trial. The principal question in the decision
was whether or not plaintiff should have sought review by writ of
certiorari. At the time, statutory certiorari had not been provided for,
and the court declared that under the common law writ only questions
of jurisdiction and legality of proceedings could be reviewed. Hence
certiorari was an inadequate remedy so far as plaintiff was concerned,
and quo warranto was proper.
Certainly it appears from the decision that errors of law in the
removal of plaintiff could be corrected in quo warranto proceedings.
But the decision is not explicit concerning the extent to which the
factual findings of cause should be re-tried below. Perhaps the
question of cause was tried anew. The language of the statute seems
to authorize such a procedure. On the other hand, the trial court may
only have heard the evidence to determine whether or not it was sufficient to sustain the mayor's finding of cause.
'o' State v. Mills, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560 (1891); State v. Doherty, 16
Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958 (1897).
1o0State v. Burke, 8 Wash. 412, 36 Pac. 281 (1894); State v. McQuade.
12 Wash. 554, 41 Pac. 897 (1895); Kimball v. Olmsted, 20 Wash. 629, 56
Pac. 377 (1899); State v. Byrne, 31 Wash. 213, 71 Pac. 746 (1903); see State
v. Cheetham, 19 Wash. 330, 53 Pac. 349 (1898).
'1 State v. Otis, 131 Wash. 455, 230 Pac. 414 (1924).
318 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894). Accord: State v. Kirkwood, 15 Wash.
298, 46 Pac. 331 (1896).
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Today there is doubt that quo warranto would issue in the circumstances of the Van Brocklin case. The decision was based on the
narrowness and inadequacy of the common law writ of certiorari, and
that ground is largely wanting now. Statutory certiorari is far more
searching in its review of the merits of a determination than was
the common law writ. It does not afford a trial de novo, as possibly
quo warranto would, but it does authorize a court to weigh the sufficiency and preponderance of evidence. Of significance is the
fact that since statutory certiorari has been provided for, quo warranto has not been used to review the merits of a removal from office
after hearing. Statutory certiorari has been recognized as the correct
procedure to obtain court review of a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of an administrative tribunal.
On the other hand, argument may be made that the language of
the statute gives a court plenary jurisdiction to try title to an office in
quo warranto. Argument may be made that the removing officer's
hearing is only ancillary and does not diminish the court's jurisdiction,
unless statute expressly so provides. If the trial is de novo, from the
plaintiff's standpoint the information is more satisfactory and "adequate" than statutory certiorari. If the trial is only on the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the removal, there is no advantage in the
proceeding as compared with statutory certiorari.
Quo warranto does not seem to have been employed to test the
merits of a discharge by a civil service commission. In mandamus
cases, if plaintiff has had a fair hearing, the cause is not frivolous, and
some competent evidence supports the removal, the commission's decision will not be disturbed. It is inconceivable that a different rule
would prevail if quo warranto were used. A principal reason for the
rule in mandamus cases is that a municipality could authorize discharges without cause, and the reason would operate as strongly in
quo warranto proceedings.
The statutory information in the nature of quo warranto is an
effective method for securing court review of certain special types of
administrative determinations. Where plaintiff claims that he has
won an election, the certification of a canvassing board is of little
weight, and the law and facts will be tried anew. The right to a civil
service "office," as a matter of law, may be litigated, but the factual
merits of a discharge will probably not be tried. In cases of removal
from other offices quo warranto will bring no relief where the removing
officer has acted within his statutory (or constitutional) authority and
the removed officer has no right to a hearing. Where the removed
officer does have a right to a hearing, the function of the writ is not
clear. Perhaps it may be used to try again the merits of the removal.
Or possibly only questions of law and sufficiency of evidence may be
reviewed.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
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PROHIBITION

The common law writ of prohibition issues to prevent a court or
other tribunal exercising judicial functions from acting without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.109 In Washington the writ granted in the
superior courts is defined by statute:
REM. REV. STAT. § 1027. The writ of prohibition is
the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such
proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board or person.
Section 1028 states that the writ may be issued "in all cases where
there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." It is to be noticed that Section 1027 does not restrict prohibition to cases in which the tribunal, corporation, board, or person is
performing a judicial function.
An excellent comparison of the common law and statutory writs in
Washington has been made in Winsor v. Bridges."10 The regents of
the University of Washington petitioned the supreme court to prohibit
the board of state land commissioners from selling or leasing certain
university lands. The regents asserted exclusive power to lease and
sell. The supreme court denied the writ, holding that the threatened
acts of the board were administrative or executive and not judicial.
The court declared that under Article IV, Section 4, of the state
constitution it could only issue the common law writ of prohibition.
This writ could issue against judicial or quasi-judicial acts but not
against administrative, executive, or legislative acts. The superior
courts also had jurisdiction to grant the writ, of which they could not
be divested, but under Article IV, Section 6, of the constitution the
legislature had power to extend the scope of the remedy. Thus, the
enactment of 1895 providing for statutory prohibition was constitutional even though it authorized the grant of the writ against acts not
judicial in nature. The discussion in the case concerning the jurisdiction of the supreme and superior courts and the power of the legislature
to extend the scope of the remedy was equally applicable to the writs of
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
At the present time the common law (or constitutional) writ of
prohibition is issued by the supreme court. The language of the
constitution seems to require that the writ issue only in connection
with appeals or revisions pending in the court, but this restriction has
1oSee Freund, op. cit. supra note 42, p. 240; Hart, op. cit. supra note
42, pp. 484-486; Spelling, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 1716-20, 1722-1726, 1744.
The statutes governing the writ in Washington are RE.W. REv. STAT. §f
1027-1033 (Laws 1895, pp. 119, 120).
11024 Wash. 540, 64 Pac. 780 (1901).
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been rejected because it would cause the writ to be of rare utility."1
Before 1895 the writ issued from the superior courts, but since then
the statutory proceeding has been available.
Common law prohibition has been granted most frequently from
the supreme court to the superior courts. That the purpose of the writ
is to prevent a court from acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction
is a statement repeatedly made and adhered to. 11 2 The early cases
established that for the writ to issue plaintiff had to show that the
inferior court was about to assume a jurisdiction it did not have, that
the court still had something to do under the claim of jurisdiction,
that it had refused an application for a ruling that it did not have
jurisdiction, and that there was no other proper remedy. In numerous cases it has been held that, assuming the inferior court had jurisdiction, prohibition will not issue to correct errors of law or of fact. 13
These cases include many where the lower court was alleged to be proceeding in an erroneous manner. Errors of law or of fact or in
proceeding, where there is no defect of jurisdiction, must be corrected on appeal or by writ of certiorari.
Even where a court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, many
decisions have said that prohibition will not be granted if the remedy
by appeal is adequate." 4 Confusion has existed in the decisions as
to the circumstances making appeal adequate or inadequate. It now
appears that if, as a matter of law, a court has no jurisdiction over a
subject-matter or has acquired no jurisdiction over the parties or an
2x' State v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 668, 47 Pac. 31 (1896); Winsor v.
Bridges, supra note 110; State v. Taylor, 101 Wash. 148, 172 Pac. 217 (1918).
The same may be said concerning the writ of certiorari.
'-"State v. Superior Court, 2 Wash. 9, 25 Pac. 1007 (1891); State v.
Superior Court, 6 Wash. 112, 32 Pac. 1072 (1893); Harris v. Brooker, 8
Wash. 138, 35 Pac. 599 (1894); Clifford v. Parker, 13 Wash. 518, 43 Pac.
717 (1896); State v. Superior Court, 13 Wash. 638, 43 Pac. 877 (1896); State
v. Clifford, 78 Wash., 555, 139 Pac. 650 (1914); State v. Superior Court, 86
Wash. 685, 151 Pac. 108 (1915); State v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 24, 267
Pac. 775 (1928).
123 State v.
Jones, 2 Wash. 662, 27 Pac. 452 (1891); State v. Superior
Court, 17 Wash. 12, 48 Pac. 741 (1897); State v. Benson, 21 Wash. 571, 58
Pac. 1066 (1899); State v. Superior Court, 32 Wash. 498, 73 Pac. 479 (1903);
State v. Tallman, 38 Wash. 132, 80 Pac. 272 (1905); State v. Clifford, 78
Wash. 555, 139 Pac. 650 (1914); State v. Superior Court, 110 Wash. 255,
188 Pac. 391 (1920); State v. Walker, 148 Wash. 610, 270 Pac. 126 (1928);
State v. Bell, 157 Wash. 279, 289 Pac. 25 (1930); State v. Superior Court,
159 Wash. 372, 293 Pac. 283 (1930).
22' State v.
Superior Court, 36 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 29 (1905); State v.
Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877 (1905); State v. Superior Court,
50 Wash. 650, 97 Pac. 778 (1908); State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 370, 121
Pac. 836 (1912); State. v. Superior Court, 73 Wash. 296, 131 Pac. 816 (1913);
State v. Clifford, 78 Wash. 555, 139 Pac. 650 (1914); State v. Superior
Court, 112 Wash. 501, 192 Pac. 937 (1920); State v. Superior Court, 135
Wash. 344, 237 Pac. 717 (1925); State v. Superior Court, 149 Wash. 50, 270
Pac. 128 (1928).
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action, appeal is inadequate." 5 If prohibition were denied, petitioner
would be compelled to expend time and money in trial and in having
the proceedings nullified on appeal. If, however, jurisdiction depends
on a fact and the court has power to hear evidence and to determine
the existence of the fact, prohibition is not available, and errors must
be corrected on appeal or by writ of certiorari.
In a number of instances the supreme court has assumed jurisdiction
under the common law writ to decide whether or not an administrative
body should be prohibited from proceeding in a cause." 6 The court has
said:
"When our constitution was adopted, the courts and text
writers of this country generally held that the writ was to
restrain the exercise of unauthorized judicial or quasi judicial
power, and that the remedy might be invoked against any
court, or body of persons, board, or officers assuming to exercise judicial or quasi judicial powers, although not strictly or
technically a court. .

.

. Undoubtedly this is the function the

writ is to perform under our constitution. The writ, as so understood, was to prohibit proceedings of a judicial nature,
but not to prohibit merely administrative, executive, or
ministerial acts.... If the court or organized body in the particular is acting only in an administrative or executive capacity, although in other matters it may exercise judicial powers, a
writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy, however illegal
such administrative or executive acts may be."" 7
From time to time the court has stated that prohibition will not issue
against "administrative," "executive," "legislative," "discretionary,"
"ministerial," or "clerical" acts. The distinction between these acts
and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has not always been clear. In a few
cases where the supreme court has assumed jurisdiction one may doubt
(1892); State v.
2115 State v. Superior Court, 4 Wash. 655, 30 Pac. 1053
Superior Court, 17 Wash. 54, 48 Pac. 733 (1897); State v. Superior Court,
76 Wash. 27, 135 Pac. 494 (1913); State v. Superior Court, 88 Wash. 612,
153 Pac. 315 (1915); State v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630
(1917); State v. Superior Court, 122 Wash. 555, 211 Pac. 764 (1922); State
v. Superior Court, 144 Wash. 44, 257 Pac. 837 (1927); State v. Superior
Court, 145 Wash. 532, 261 Pac. 97 (1927), reversing 144 Wash. 351, 258 Pac.
27 (1927); State v. Superior Court, 159 Wash. 335, 293 Pac. 986 (1930).
116
State v. Bridges, 22 Wash. 98, 60 Pac. 66 (1900); State v. Board of
State Land Comm'rs, 23 Wash. 700, 63 Pac. 532 (1901); Winsor v. Bridges,
discussed at note 110, supra; State v. Ross, 39 Wash. 399. 81 Pac. 865 (1905);
State v. Ross, 62 Wash. 82, 113 Pac. 273 (1911); State v. Hinkle, 130 Wash.
419, 227 Pac. 861 (1924); State v. Schaaf, 185 Wash. 354, 54 P.(2d) 1014
(1936). In State v. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 Pac. 1029 (1909), application
to prohibit a superior court from appointing a water commissioner pursuant to statutory authority was denied because the court was not acting
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
In the following cases the common law writ was sought in the superior
court. State v. Prosser, 2 Wash. 530, 27 Pac. 550 (1891); State v. Prosser, 4
Wash. 816, 30 Pac. 734 (1892); Stimson Mill Co. v. Board of Harbor
Comm'rs, 4 Wash. 6, 29 Pac. 938 (1892).
127 State v. Board
of State Land Comm'rs, supra note 116, 63 Pac., at
p. 532.
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that the administrative body exercised a judicial or quasi-judicial
function.118 In these cases, apparently, the question was not raised.
Where statutory prohibition has been sought against an adcuinistrative tribunal, the superior courts have not been troubled with the
question whether or not judicial or quasi-judicial functions were being
exercised. For the writ to issue the only requirement, apart from
inadequacy of appeal, is that the tribunal be acting without or beyond
its jurisdiction. 1" 9 Statutory prohibition has been a useful device for
testing the validity of legislation and the legality of acts about to be
done by governmental officials.
It is entirely clear that neither common law nor statutory, prohibition
may be granted simply to correct errors of law or of fact in an administrative proceeding. 20 Assuming that a board has jurisdiction, errors
in exercising its powers must be reviewed by appeal or by writ of
certiorari. Sometimes a close question may arise whether an act is in
excess of jurisdiction or is merely an erroneous exercise of acknowledged jurisdiction.
State v. Board of Education'2' illustrates a novel use of the writ of
prohibition. Plaintiff was a superintendent of schools and was charged
with misfeasance and malfeasance. The board of directors of the school
district were about to try plaintiff on these charges. Plaintiff peti218State v. Howell, 70 Wash. 467, 126 Pac. 954 (1912) (writ granted);
State v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P. (2d) 173 (1938) (writ denied).
1219
State v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 Pac. 243 (1897); Pierce County v.
Spike, 19 Wash. 652, 54 Pac. 41 (1898); State v. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 62
Pac. 143 (1900) (judicial function); State v. Kuykendall, 117 Wash. 415,
201 Pac. 778 (1921); State v. Denney, 150 Wash. 690, 274 Pac. 791 (1929)
(judicial function); State v. Murray, 181 Wash. 27, 42 P.(2d) 429 (1935);
State v. Pat Kelly, 186 Wash. 589, 59 P. (2d) 373 (1936); State v. Superior
Court, 188 Wash. 19, 61 P. (2d) 143 (1936); State v. State Tax Commission,
189 Wash. 56, 63 P. (2d) 494 (1937) (judicial function).
'"0State v. Denney, State v. Hogg, supra note 119.
"119 Wash. 8, 52 Pac. 317 (1898). A similar case is State v. Superior
Court, 72 Wash. 444, 130 Pac. 747 (1913), in which plaintiff brought an
action in the superior court "to review" an order of a board of school
directors dismissing her as a teacher. Plaintiff alleged that the county
superintendent was prejudiced against her and dominated the board; that
she had no opportunity to answer the false charges brought against her;
and that no record was kept of the proceedings before the board. Plaintiff had a statutory right to appeal to the county superintendent and then
to the state superintendent. But the appeal procedure was alleged to be
inadequate because the appeal to the state superintendent was on the record made before the county superintendent. Citing State v. Board of Education, the supreme court held that plaintiff's allegations stated a cause of
action. The superior court "had jurisdiction to review the order of
the board of directors and to determine whether the order was made
with or without cause." The case is not altogether clear as to what the
writ of certiorari accomplished. Apparently the board would have to
certify its record for review by the court on the sufficiency and preponderance of evidence. If no record existed, or if plaintiff had no opportunity to defend herself before the board, the case would be remanded
for a full, fair hearing. While the county supeiintendent was not prevented from having contact with the board, his dominating influence

may have been weakened by the decision.
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tioned for statutory prohibition to prevent one Wells from sitting as a
member of the board. He alleged that Wells was an enemy of plaintiff, that he was biased, and that he had publicly declared that he
would vote to remove plaintiff whatever the evidence might be. The
supreme court held that the writ should issue. It relied upon a line of
New York decisions holding that a biased member of a tribunal
should be removed unless his absence would cause the tribunal to be
unable to act. The principal decision is off the beaten track, unless
it can be said that a prejudiced member of a board acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is an important decision in
pointing to a remedy against bias in an administrative body. It is
authority that prohibition may be granted to prevent a prejudiced
member of a board from sitting in judgment on a case, at least where
the board will not thereby be rendered incapable of acting.
In general, the writ of prohibition has a narrow function in administrative law. The common law writ in Washington issues to prevent an
administrative body, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, from
acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The statutory writ has
the same function, but is not limited to acts of a judicial or quasijudicial nature. Prohibition often serves the same purpose as injunction. Two points of distinction are that the former is an extraordinary
remedy at law and does not issue against private persons. Neither
the common law nor statutory writ is granted to review errors of law or
of fact or in proceeding. Such errors must be corrected by appeal or
by writ of certiorari. Prohibition will not issue where there is an adequate remedy by appeal, but this restriction has not figured prominently where an administrative board acts without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. Finally, prohibition has been used in Washington to
prevent a biased member of a board from participating in a determination.
HABEAS ComUus

The writ of habeas corpus is of ancient origin and issues to inquire
into the cause for a person's detention or imprisonment. 12 2 The
petitioner may be the person detained or someone acting in his behalf.
The writ is provided for by statute in Washington:
REm. REv. STAT. § 1063. Every person restrained of
his liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ
of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and
shall be delivered therefrom when illegal.
Section 1074. The court or judge shall . . . proceed in a
summary way to hear and determine the cause, and if no
legal cause be shown for the restraint or for the continuation
thereof, shall discharge the party.
Both the supreme and superior courts have jurisdiction to grant the
122See Freund, op. cit. supra note 42, pp. 240-242; Hart, op. cit. supra
note 42, pp. 479-481; Spelling, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 1151-1157.
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writ,1 23 and it has the same function in the appellate court as it does
in the courts below. However, the supreme court issues the writ
only where the case is one of public interest or there is no other adequate remedy.1 24 One reason is that it is inexpedient for the court to
try questions of fact.
In by far the majority of instances habeas corpus has been employed
in criminal cases to test a court order or judgment leading to plaintiff's
incarceration. From these cases has emerged the leading principle that,
assuming the court had jurisdiction, habeas corpus 'may not be substituted for appeal procedures to correct errors of law or of fact. 25 However, if the court was completely without jurisdiction to pass judgment or to issue its order, the writ is a proper and efficient method to
obtain plaintiff's freedom. The Washington practice is in accord with
the general rule elsewhere in the United States.
Habeas corpus has been of limited utility in challenging administrative determinations because few of them lead to imprisonment. The
cases which have arisen give some understanding of the role of the
writ in administrative law in Washington. To be kept in mind is the
principle that habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal procedures.
In Spencer v. KeesU28 plaintiff was an inmate of the state penitentiary, having been convicted of murder. The governor pardoned him on
the conditions that he remain under surveillance of a doctor and that he
be cared -for by relatives. On being apprised that the conditions had
been breached, the governor cancelled the pardon, and plaintiff was
taken in custody by the superintendent of the penitentiary. In habeas
corpus proceedings the trial court put the burden of proof on the state,
but judgment went against plaintiff nevertheless. The supreme court,
after holding that the governor had power to grant conditional
pardons, said:
"If the appellant was entitled to a trial upon the allegation
that he had violated the conditions of the pardon, the court
granted that' right to him in'this proceeding and placed the
burden upon the state to show that appellant had violated the
terms of the pardon. It has been held that this may be done
in cases of this kind." 2 '
§§ 4, 6; REm. REv. STAT § 1066.
Emch, 124 Wash. 401, 214 Pac. 1043 (1923).
Ex
parte
1"4
'25 Ex parte Richard Williams, 1 Wash. Terr. 240 (1867); Steiner v.
Nerton, 6 Wash. 23, 32 Pac. 1063 (1893); In re Nolan, 21 Wash. 395, 58
Pac. 222 (1899); In re Casey, 27 Wash. 686, 68 Pac. 185 (1902); Ex parte
Newcomb, 56 Wash. 395, 105 Pac. 1042 (1909); Ex parte Herman; 79 Wash.
149, 139 Pac. 1083 (1914); Ex parte Parent, 112 Wash. 620, .192 Pac. 947
(1920); Thomas v. Phelan, 157 Wash. 471, 289 Pac. 51 (1930); Ex parte
Cavitt, 170 Wash. 84, 15 P. (2d) 276 (1932). Accord: U. S. v. Hunt, 16 F.
Supp. 285 (Dist. Ct. 1936). See Spelling, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 1191, 1202,
1206-1208, 1215-1217.
12847 Wash. 276, 91 Pac. 963 (1907).
127 47 Wash. at p. 282, 91 Pac. at p. 965.
1" WAsH CONST. Art. IV,
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All the cases cited were from other jurisdictions. In this expression the
court did not commit itself to a rule making plaintiff entitled to a
judicial trial on the issue of breach of conditions.
In State v. Superior Court1- one Williams was arrested as a disorderly person. The city health commissioner found him infected with
venereal disease and had him committed, pursuant to ordinance, to a
hospital for treatment. Williams appealed to the state board of health
and it affirmed the commissioner's action. Williams then sued out a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging he did not have venereal disease, and the
superior court ordered an examination by three physicians. The health
commissioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the examination.
The supreme court granted the writ, stating that it was "within the
power of the Legislature, in dealing with the problems of public health,
to make the determination of a fact by a properly constituted health
' 9
12
officer final and binding upon the public as well as upon the courts.'
Habeas corpus was ineffective to cause a re-trial of a fact issue clearly
given to an administrative tribunal to determine.
Pellisier v. Reed 30 is a case in which plaintiff was sentenced to the
state reformatory. The board of managers transferred him to the
state penitentiary, and later he was conditionally paroled. Subsequently, he was convicted of burglary and sentenced again to the
reformatory. Thereupon the superintendent of the penitentiary took
him into custody for violation of his conditional parole. Plaintiff
petitioned for writ of habeas corpus claiming that his original transfer
to the penitentiary was unlawful. The supreme court held that the
board of managers had statutory authority to make the transfer and
refused the writ. The court went on to say that it did "not want to be
understood as holding, for the present at least, that a prisoner could be
denied the right of showing in an appropriate proceeding an abuse of
discretion on the part of the board."'131
Ex parte Canary 22 is a similar case in which plaintiff was convicted of
grand larceny and sentenced to the women's industrial home and clinic.
Later she was transferred to the state penitentiary, the officers of the
home acting under a statute authorizing transfer in the case of any
inmate "who shall appear

. . .

to be incorrigible, or whose presence in

said institution is detrimental to its well-being." Plaintiff denied she
was incorrigible or detrimental to the well-being of the industrial home,
and sued out a writ of habeas corpus. The supreme court held that
the fact issue raised by plaintiff, as well as the question of abuse of
discretion, could not be tried in habeas corpus. Some form of pro12 103 Wash. 409, 17.4 Pac. 973 (1918).
111174 Pac., at p. 979.
:10 75 Wash. 201, 134 Pac. 813 (1913).
1134 Pac., at p. 815.
132 116 Wash. 559, 200 Pac. 307 (1921).
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ceeding for the correction of errors would have to be resorted to, and
the court repeated what it had said in the Pellisier decision concerning
abuse of discretion. It seems clear that, in the absence of statutory
appeal, certiorari was plaintiff's remedy. Apparently the writ would
afford relief only if the record disclosed abuse of discretion.
Habeas corpus is a proper procedure to secure release of one who has
regained mental soundness after having been committed by a court to
a public institution for the insane. In Washington plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence (1) that he is sane,
(2) that he is probably free from danger of relapse, (3) that he has
applied for discharge, and (4) that the superintendent of the institution
has arbitrarily refused to release him.'" As a practical proposition
arbitrary conduct is made out if plaintiff sustains the burden of proof
on items (1),(2) and (3). The decisions indicate that the courts
give considerable weight to the superintendent's determination and
require a clear showing before plaintiff is granted his freedom.
These several cases furnish a basis for some generalizations concerning the function of habeas corpus in administrative law. If an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to make a determination, the writ may
not be used to correct errors of fact or of law. If, as a matter of law,
the board has no jurisdiction to act, habeas corpus is an efficient
method for securing plaintiff's freedom. For instance, if a board
acts under unconstitutional legislation, the writ would seem to lie. In
habeas corpus proceedings the courts exercise traditional care in deciding whether or not plaintiff is lawfully detained. But where a board is
entrusted by valid statute with a determination resulting in a person's
detention, the great probability is that the merits will not be reviewed
under the writ. Statutory appeal or certiorari is the proper remedy.
INJUNCTION

Injunction is a writ or decree granted to prevent the doing of a
wrongful act which would otherwise cause irreparable injury to property.'1 4 It is an extraordinary remedy issuing from a court of equitable
jurisdiction. The threatened injury must be serious, actual, and im-'
pending, and there must be no adequate remedy at law.' For present
purposes this is a sufficient statement concerning the nature of the writ.
However, volumes have been written about the principles governing
injunction and the circumstances under which it has been granted.
23SEx parte Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905); State v. Clifford,
106 Wash. 16, 179 Pac. 90 (1919); Ex parte Rath, 143 Wash. 65, 254 Pac. 466
(1927); Soderquist v. Keller, 21 Wn.(2) 1, 149 P.(2d) 528 (1944); see

RmL lIEV. STAT. § 1064. Where plaintiff has been acquitted of crime because
of insanity and confined, to secure release on the ground of restoration of
sanity plaintiff must resort to the statutory remedy, and habeas corpus is
not18
available.
Stateop.
v. Superior Court, 159 Wash. 335, 293 Pac. 986 (1930).
,
See Freund,
cit. supra note 42, pp. 237-239; Hart, op. cit. supra
note 42, pp. 458-461; Pommoy's EQuITy JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941), §§ 216220, 222, 1337, 1338, 1359, 1359a; Spelling, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 1, 3, 4, 1114, 18.
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In Washington jurisdiction to issue injunction is vested in the
superior courts.'35 Statutes have been passed regulating procedures in
securing the writ.' 36 But the substantive law of injunction has been
left for judicial development.
In probably most cases where injunction is sought against a state
officer, no adjudicating function or discretionary act is involved.
Petitioner may complain of interpretation or application of a statute.
Or he may challenge the constitutionality of legislation pursuant to
which defendant officer is acting. In the suit questions of fact will be
resolved. The court will try the merits, both legal and factual, as in an
ordinary civil action. No weight will be given the officer's opinion or
determination that he should act in a particular way.
To be distinguished from this type of case is that in which a state
officer or tribunal is entrusted with discretion or has an adjudicating
function. Special grounds must now appear for the grant of injunction.
A common statement is that the determination must be fraudulent,
arbitrary or capricious, or done without jurisdiction, before equity will
act.137 Washington decisions are in accord with this statement.
Where discretion is vested in an officer or tribunal, it will not be
controlled by injunction, in the absence of fraud, or arbitrary or
capricious conduct.-38 A court will not assume to decide that the officer
or tribunal is acting unwisely and to substitute its own discretion.
Findings by a board of county commissioners of unforeseen emergency
and of necessity for exceeding statutory limitations on debt are to a
high degree discretionary, and injunction has been denied. 3 9 Various
determinations of a legislative and political nature are not subject to
control in a court of equity.140 In all these instances there has been
:'5 WASH. CONST. ART. IV, § 6; REM. REV. STAT. § 718.
REM. REV. STAT. §§ 718-739 (Laws 1854, pp. 152-154).
3 7

'3

1
See Hart, op. cit. supra note 42, p. 460; Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note
134, § 1345a.
138State v. Milligan, 3 Wash. 144, 28 Pac. 369 (1891); Times Publishing
Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894) (award of printing
contract to bidder asking four times as much as competitor held abuse of
discretion); Schlopp v. Forrest, 11 Wash. 640, 40 Pac. 133 (1895); Hodgeman
v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915); Columbia River T. & L. Co.
v. Com'rs of Diking Dist. No. 2, 108 Wash. 148, 183 Pac. 134 (1919); Biagini
v. Shoemaker, 122 Wash. 204, 210 Pac. 193 (1922); State v. Renschler, 172
Wash. 223, 19 P. (2d) 931 (1933); State v. Superior Court, 15 Wn. (2d) 673,
131 P.(2d) 943 (1942).
139 Rummens v. Evans, 168 Wash. 527, 13 P. (2d)
26 (1932); Kruesel v.
Collin, 170 Wash. 233, 16 P.(2d) 442 (1932) (determination will not be
reversed unless "evidence clearly preponderates against it, or it appears
that the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously").
0 Seattle Transfer Co. v. City of Seattle, 27 Wash. 520, 68 Pac. 90 (1902)
(improvement of road); Ewing v. Seattle, 55 Wash. 229, 104 Pac. 259
(1909) (grant of franchise to operate street railway); Twichell v. City of
Seattle, 106 Wash. 32, 179 Pac. 127 (1919) (purchase of street car system);
State v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966 (1922) (grant of pool
hall license); see Vincent v. City of Seattle, 115 Wash. 475, 197 Pac. 618, 619
(1921).
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a realization that the officer or tribunal, and not the court, is the one
entrusted with discretion. Within wide bounds the exercise of discretion cannot successfully be challenged.
County commissioners in canvassing the vote cast on the question
of moving a county seat have an adjudicating function which is
singularly free from judicial control. Neither questions of fact nor of
law may be reviewed in the courts.14 ' The primary reason is that
the election is a political matter over which the superior court has no
jurisdiction. However, if a sham canvass is proved, injunction will be
granted until such time as a real one is had.142 Further, if statutory
requirements with respect to the number of persons petitioning for
removal have not been met, jurisdiction to hold the election and to
canvass the returns is lacking, and injunction may be obtained.143
In a few instances injunction has been employed in civil service
cases. As a remedy it is no more effective than mandamus and is obtained with greater difficulty. Mandatory injunction has issued to
compel compliance with civil service regulations and to restore plaintiff
to his rightful position. 4' The writ was sought in one discharge case
but was denied because the reason was not frivolous and was supported
by some competent evidence.'
Mandamus seems to be the preferable
and more usual method for asserting one's rights under civil service.
In general, injunction will not issue to correct errors of law or of fact
in administrative adjudications.' 48 This is the converse of the statement
that fraud, arbitrary or capricious action, or failure of jurisdiction are
the bases for equitable relief in administrative law. In fact, most of
the authority that injunction will not issue to review ordinary errors
of law or of fact is to be found in cases where the court relies on one
of these exceptional grounds for granting relief. By implication these
special grounds exclude ordinary errors of law and fact as grounds for
injunction. Ordinary errors must be corrected in appeal proceedings or
by writ of certiorari. That injunction is not available to correct errors
of fact is an extension of the rule that the writ will not issue to control
an exercise of discretion.
It is to be observed that the role of injunction in administrative
law is analogous to that of mandamus. One remedy is granted to
Il Injunction denied; Parmeter v. Bourne, 8 Wash. 45, 35 Pac. 586
(1894); Heffner -v. Board of Com'rs, 16 Wash. 273, 47 Pac. 430 (1896);
Mann v. Wright, 81 Wash. 358, 142 Pac. 697 (1914).
12 Krieschel v. Board of Com'rs, 12 Wash. 428, 41 Pac. 186 (1895).
"' Rickey v. Williams, 8 Wash. 479, 36 Pac. 480 (1894).
1 Easson v. City of Seattle, 32 Wash. 405, 73 Pac. 496 (1903) (civil service commission had no jurisdiction to remove plaintiff in absence of
dismissal by his superior; questions as to appropriateness of remedy
waived); Gilmur v. City of Seattle, 69 Wash. 289, 124 Pac. 919 (1912);
Petley v. City of Tacoma, 127 Wash. 459, 221 Pac. 579 (1923).
1 Price v. City of Seattle, 39 Wash. 376, 81 Pac. 847 (1905).
16Seattle Wharf Co. v. Callvert, 42 Wash. 390, 85 Pac. 16 (1906);
Tuffts v. Kiffee, 97 Wash. 500, 166 Pac. 788 (1917); see State v. Superior
Court, 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966, 967 (1922).
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compel action, the other to prevent action, where an officer has no
discretion and violates his statutory or constitutional duty. Neither
writ issues to control an exercise of discretion, except in instances of
clear abuse. Neither writ may ordinarily be employed to review
findings of fact or application of law in an administrative adjudication. Where mandatory injunction is granted, the relief is often indistinguishable from that which mandamus would afford.
As in the case of mandamus, one cannot say with accuracy that injunction never issues to correct errors of law in administrative determinations. Indeed, the statement is probably less true of injunction
than it is of mandamus. Beyond this, it appears in some instances
that an equity court will review the factual merits of an administrative
determination.
Tax assessments have been the subject-matter of a large group of
cases in which injunction has been employed to secure judicial review
of the merits of an administrative determination. Injunction has
developed as the leading remedy in these cases because statutory appeal
has not generally been available and because certiorari is inadequate. 47
The basis for relief has been fraud, a concept which has been materially
broadened. If an assessment is so grossly inequitable or palpably
excessive as to constitute actual or "constructive" fraud, injunction may
be obtained. Within the doctrine of constructive fraud are unequal
or discriminatory assessment, arbitrary assessment made without the
exercise of judgment, valuation of property on a fundamentally wrong
basis resulting in excessive assessment, and flagrantly excessive valuation unaccompanied by other improper conduct." 8 In granting relief on
these grounds the court reviews the evidence, facts, and law entering
into the assessor's determination. However, the trial is not conducted
for the purpose of simply affording the taxpayer with a second valuation of his property.14 Before the court will interfere, he must prove
...
Between 1925 and 1931 provision was made for statutory appeal.
STAT. § 11097. See text at notes 24 and 62, supra.
"I Andrew v. King County, 1 Wash. 46, 23 Pac. 409 (1890); Benn v.
Chehalis County, 11 Wash. 135, 39 Pac. 365 (1895); Knapp v. King County,
17 Wash. 567, 50 Pac. 480 (1897); Landes Estate Co. v. Clallam County, 19
Wash. 569, 53 Pac. 670 (1898); Templeton v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 377,
65 Pac. 553 (1901); Savage v. Pierce County, 68 Wash. 623, 123 Pac. 1088
(1912); Stimson Timber Co. v. Mason County, 112 Wash. 603, 192 Pac. 994
(1920); Samish Gun Club v. Skagit County, 118 Wash. 578, 204 Pac. 181
(1922); Finch v. Grays Harbor County, 121 Wash. 486, 209 Pac. 833
(1922); Norpia Realty Corp. v. Thurston County, 131 Wash. 675, 231 Pac.
13 (1924); Willapa Elec. Co. v. Pacific County, 160 Wash. 412, 295 Pac. 152
(1931). The decisions are classified and discussed in Rupp, The Doctrine
of Constructive Fraud in the Washington Law of Taxation, 12 WASH. L.
REv. 205 (1937).
"4 Olympia Water Works v. Gelbach, 16 Wash. 482, 48 Pac. 251 (1897);
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 108, 104 Pac. 178 (1909);
Doty Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Lewis County, 60 Wash. 428, 111 Pac. 562
(1910); Adams County v. Scott, 117 Wash. 85, 200 Pac. 1112 (1921).

REma. REV.
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constructive fraud (or actual fraud) by a preponderance of clear and
convincing evidence. Generally, he must prove that the assessment is
grossly disproportionate or palpably excessive.
Legislation was passed in 1931 forbidding issuance of injunction "to
restrain the collection of any tax.. . except. . . where the law under
which the tax is imposed is void .. . (or) where the property upon
which the tax is imposed is exempt from taxation." 150 After the collection process has begun, one must pay the tax levied under protest,
specifying reasons, and then sue for the unlawful or excessive amounts
paid. Exactly when the "collection" of a tax begins is not clear. An
able writer in this lEviEw has concluded from analysis of the cases
that to be on the safe side one should seek injunction before the State
Board of Equalization has completed its work. 1" If plaintiff files suit in
time, the doctrine of constructive fraud with all its potentialities is
open to him. If he does not bring suit for injunction promptly
enough, he may still assert the doctrine, but he must do so in an action
for taxes paid under protest.
Where an administrative tribunal is without jurisdiction in making a
determination, injunction may be obtained. A variety of decisions
illustrates this principle. A taxing body acting pursuant to unconstitutional legislation or levying upon exempt property has no jurisdiction. 5 2 The statute prohibiting injunction against collection of taxes
excepts from its scope cases of this type. Serious defects in proceedings
leading up to an election on the question of annexing territory to a
municipality are cause for injunction.' 53 If the petition or notices
are insufficient or if polling places are not established in accordance
with statute, there is a failure of jurisdiction. The annexation of
territory subjects property to new tax burdens and other restrictions,
and the owners have a right that proceedings be initiated and followed
through in a legal manner. While the election is recognized to be a
political matter, the threat to property rights is basis for the intervention of equity.
Lack of proper notice or of a petition with a sufficient number of
qualified signers has been cause for injunction against the formation of
5
.REV REv. STAT. §§ 11315-1-11315-7 (Laws 1931, p. 201, amended, Laws
1939,51p. 772).

2 McAllister, Taxpayere' Remedies-Washington Property Taxes, 13
WAsH. L. REv. 91, 115-121 (1938). See also Eldridge, The Determination
of Property Taxes in Washington, 16 WASH. L. XRv. 13, 33, 34 (1941).
152Phillips v. Thurston County, 35 Wash.- 187, 76 Pac. 993 (1904)
(exempt property); Seattle & P. S.Packing Co. v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 49, 97
Pac. 1093 (1908) (same); North American Lumber Co. v. City of Blaine, 89
Wash. 366, 154 Pac. 446 (1916) (same), earlier proceedings, 81 Wash. 13,
142 Pac. 438 (1914); Drum v. University Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585,
258 Pac. 505 (1927) (unconstitutional legislation).
211State v. Superior Court, 36 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 29 (1905); State v.

Nicoll, 40 Wash. 517, 82 Pac. 895 (1905); Amos Brown's Estate v. City of

West Seattle, 43 Wash. 26, 85 Pac. 854 (1906); Wilton v. Pierce County, 61
Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386 (1910).
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a water or diking district, or against a special assessment for an improvement.154 However, in a number of cases the doctrines of estoppel and
waiver have defeated plaintiff's action where he acquiesced in the proceedings and led the assessing tribunal to believe he had no objection
on jurisdictional grounds.155 Several cases have arisen involving the
construction, improvement, or vacation of a road. County commissioners have no authority to act unless the statutory number of adjacent
property owners petition and proper notice is given.' 56 A miscellany of
decisions may be found in which an administrative determination is
enjoined for lack of jurisdiction for reasons other than insufficiency of
notice or petition. 157
No simple rule can be stated as to what are jurisdictional matters
and what are not. 158 A statute providing for proceedings leading up to
an administrative determination affecting property rights modifies, or
is in derogation of, the common law. Accordingly, the courts incline to
strictness in requiring the administrative tribunal to pursue its lawful
'"Buckley v. City of Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 37 Pac. 441 (1894); Barlow
v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wash. 32, 40 Pac. 382 (1895); Wingate v. City of
Tacoma, 13 Wash. 603, 43 Pac. 874 (1896); Ruffin v. Sewell, 134 Wash. 208,
235 Pac. 31 (1925); Drum v. University Place Water Dist., 144 Wash. 585,
258 Pac. 505 (1927) (statute failing to give property owners within district
opportunity to object held unconstitutional); Desimone v. Shields, 152
Wash. 353, 277 Pac. 829 (1929).
1. Barlow v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wash. 32, 40 Pac. 382 (1895); Wingate v.
City of Tacoma, 13 Wash. 603, 43 Pac. 874; Rucker Bros. v. City of Everett,
66 Wash. 366, 119 Pac. 807 (1911); Desimone v. Shields, 152 Wash. 353, 277
Pac. 829 (1929).
16 Megrath v. Nickerson, 24 Wash. 235, 64 Pac. 163 (1901); Carlson v.
Kitsap County, 124 Wash. 555, 213 Pac. 930 (1923) (but plaintiff held to
have waived defects); Elsensohn v. Garfield County, 132 Wash. 229, 231
Pac. 799 (1925); Daniels v. Fossas, 152 Wash. 516, 278 Pac. 412 (1929);
Elston v. King County, 178 Wash. 210, 34 P. (2d) 906 (1934).
1"Howell v. City of Tacoma, 3 Wash. 711, 29 Pac. 447, 449 (1892)
(departure from lawful procedure so serious that jurisdiction lost); State v.
Superior Court, 36 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 29 (1905); (among other grounds,
unconstitutionality of statute and exemption of plaintiff's property from
annexation proceedings alleged); Amos Brown's Estate v. City of West
Seattle, 43 Wash. 26, 85 Pac. 854 (1906) (election void because enjoined;
therefore, annexation of territory enjoined); Seattle Cedar Lumber Mfg.
Co. v. City of Ballard, 50 Wash. 123, 96 Pac. 956 (1912) (proceedings under
repealed statute); Seattle & Puget Sound Packing Co. v. City of Seattle, 51
Wash. 49, 97 Pac. 1093 (1908) (condemnation proceeding established that
plaintiff's land was injured by improvement more than it was benefited;
hence assessment was void; Bussell v. Ross, 60 Wash. 344, 111 Pac. 165
(1910) (commissioner of public lands acted in excess of statutory authority); Collins v. City of Ellensburg, 68 Wash. 212, 122 Pac. 1010 (1912)
(levy void as to amount in excess of estimated cost); Elsensohn v. Garfield County, 132 Wash. 229, 231 Pac. 799 (1925) (among other grounds,
failure to describe lands and to file bond alleged); Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Banker, 186 Wash. 332, 58 P. (2d) 286) (1936) (plaintiff's property
should not be included in flood control district because it will not be benefited).
158 Procedural defects were held not jurisdictional in Collins v. City of
Ellensburg, 68 Wash. 212, 122 Pac. 1010 (1912); Chandler v. Puyallup, 70
Wash. 632, 127 Pac. 293 (1912); Allen v. City of Bellingham, 77 Wash. 469,
137 Pac. 1016 (1914).
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authority. If it may not act .n its own motion, a sufficient petition
by qualified persons must be presented. Notices complying with statute
must be published. A serious departure from legality in the course of
proceedings and determination must not occur. Generally, statutory
authority must be followed in such a way as to allow persons affected
full opportunity to safeguard their interests.
In the great majority of cases where injunction has issued, failure
of jurisdiction has been found as a matter of law. Either the facts were
undisputed or a demurrer admitted the facts well pleaded, and a purely
legal question was decided. Where an administrative tribunal determines on a conflict of evidence the facts on which its jurisdiction rests,
and it is authorized to do so, one might suppose that statutory appeal
or certiorari would have to be employed to secure judicial review.
However, some of the decisions seem to indicate that the existence of a
jurisdictional fact may be challenged and tried in an action for injunction.' 9 Because a presumption of regularity attaches to the proceedings
of an official body, undoubtedly plaintiff has the burden of proof.
Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge60 is an interesting case in which
a jurisdictional fact was in issue, although it was not expressly designated as such. A statute made the "shore and beach of the Pacific
Ocean" between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide "from the
Columbia River or Cape Disappointment on the south" to a point some
twenty-five or thirty miles north a public highway "forever open to
the use of the public."' 61 It declared that no part of the shore or
beach should be sold or leased. Plaintiff sued to enjoin the commissioner of public lands from leasing certain tide lands used by it in
unloading and transporting fish. The commissioner asserted the lands
were shorelands of the Columbia River and were therefore subject to
lease. The pivotal question was the point at which the waters of the
Columbia met the waters of the Pacific. In determining the point the
commissioner had drawn a line following the "general trend of the
north: shore of the Columbia River" and another line "following the
general trend of the Pacific Ocean." The angle formed by the two
lines extended was bisected, and the intersection of the bisecting line
with the Washington coast was taken as the point dividing the Pacific
shoreland from the Columbia shoreland. The supreme court held that
the commissioner had adopted an "incorrect view of the law" and that
his method of determining the point gave widely different results depending on application. Because no evidence had been presented as to
where the Columbia River actually met the Pacific Ocean, taking
1159In particular see Elston v. King County, 178 Wash. 210, 34 P. (2d)
906 (1934).
2,0155 Wash. 443, 284 Pac. 744 (1930), modifying 152 Wash. 165, 277
Pac. 459 (1929).
'Laws 1901, c. 110, §§ 1, 2.
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into consideration accretions which may have occurred since the statute
was enacted, the case was remanded for a new trial. Three judges disagreed that the commissioner had made an error of law and dissented
on the ground that his determination should be conclusive unless it was
"so far arbitrary as to be beyond the pale of reason, or was made under
a mistaken theory of the law." The dissenting opinion went to some
pains to demonstrate that no method of determining the division point
between Columbia and Pacific shorelands would be exact.
The effect of the decision was to instruct the trial court to enjoin
the commissioner of public lands if the evidence proved that he was
attempting to lease shorelands of the Pacific. In such event a vital jurisdictional fact would be lacking, and the commissioner would have no
power to act. The "jurisdictional fact doctrine" was not spoken of in
the decision, and the general statement was made that where the
commissioner commits an error of law or adopts a fundamentally wrong
theory, a court may interfere." 2 If this statement is taken as literally
true of the remedy of injunction, the equity court should become a
great forum of review of administrative determinations. However, the
likelihood is that such errors are cause for injunction only where the
result is failure of jurisdiction, actual or constructive fraud, or grossly
arbitrary action. The jurisdictional fact doctrine has not had clearcut
treatment in Washington, and one cannot be sure how effective it is as
a cause for injunction against administrative tribunals. The wisdom of
some of its applications may be doubted where it is clear that the existence of a jurisdictional fact is a matter entrusted to the administrative body for determination.
It is to be kept in mind that wherever injunction is available because
of a defect in administrative proceedings, proof must be made of threatened injury to property, irreparable in nature, for which there is no
adequate relief at law. The conditions traditionally laid down by
equity courts must be met. Assuming they are met, injunction is a
versatile and valuable remedy in administrative law. Discretionary
acts will not be controlled, but the writ will be granted to prevent
fraud or arbitrary or capricious conduct. In general, injunction may
not be used to review errors of law or of fact in an administrative determination. But fraud and failure of jurisdiction are grounds for
relief. In tax cases, where excessive or grossly disproportionate assessment is alleged, the doctrine of constructive fraud has led to judicial
review of evidence, facts, and law. One should expect the doctrine to
be extended to other administrative agencies when the proper circumstances arise. Injunction is a common remedy where an administrative
body is alleged to be without jurisdiction. Most of the cases involve a
12 Citing State v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 610, 36 Pac. 686, 1120 (1894), and id.,
13 Wash. 268, 43 Pac. 51 (1895), both cited at note 85, supra.
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pure question of law, but in instances it appears that the existence of a
jurisdictional fact may be tried. The variety of jurisdictional eases and
the doctrine of constructive fraud constitute a substantial inroad upon
the proposition that errors of law or of fact may not be corrected in a
suit for injunction. The proposition is generally true, but with reservations. The requirement that law procedures, such as statutory appeal,
be exhausted has not been strictly adhered to, especially where lack
of jurisdiction is proved.18
DiRiECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS: CONCLUSION

A distinction is sometimes drawn between direct and collateral attacks upon administrative determinations. The general statement is
made that in a direct attack the merits may be reviewed, while in a
collateral attack plaintiff will be successful only if fraud or failure of
jurisdiction is proved. The question is, in which class do the various
actions fall? Roughly speaking the Washington cases have borne out
that statutory appeal and certiorari provide a review of the merits, legal
and factual; and that the other writs and proceedings provide relief
only where arbitrary or capricious conduct, fraud, or lack of jurisdiction is proved. Thus, statutory appeal and certiorari are regarded as
procedures directly attacking a judgment or administrative determination. All other procedures are regarded as collateral attacks.
However, it must be said that this classification is not a hard and fast
one. To the extent that a finding of fact or legal conclusion of an
administrative body is subject to review, a "direct attack" is made
upon it irrespective of the type of action brought. 64 Injunction has
been employed to review the merits, 'both legal and factual, in tax
cases involving constructive fraud. Possibly this has occurred as well in
certain jurisdictional cases. Mandamus has issued to correct errors of
law in administrative proceedings. In quo warranto it appears that
election certificates and perhaps removals from office may be re-tried
in court. In all these instances a "direct attack" is made, if the expression is to be understood as having reference to judicial willingness
to examine into the merits of an administrative determination. Sta"116Elsensohn
v. Garfield County, 132 Wash. 229, 231 Pac. 799 (1925);
Daniels v. Fossas, 152 Wash. 516, 278 Pac. 412 (1929). In Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge, discussed at note 160, supra, no mention was made of
RP
n.
PREv. STAT. § 7797-125 which apparently gave plaintiff a right to
appeal to the superior court.
In Elsensohn v. Garfield County, supra, plaintiff sued for injunction
alleging jurisdictional defects, and defendant argued that certiorari
should have been sought. The court stated:
"Shall we technically hold that one remedy being a remedy at
law must be chosen and exhausted before the equitable may be
invoked? Such a course would be to turn a litigant out at one door
and invite him to re-enter at another, and we see no reason to
sanction such a practice." (231 Pac., at p. 801)
'"In Ruffin v. Sewell, 134 Wash. 208, 235 Pac. 31 (1925), a suit for
injunction because of jurisdictional defects was termed a "direct attack."
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tutory appeal and certiorari are not exclusive in providing methods
for direct attack.
A summary and comparison of the remedies available in Washington to correct errors in administrative proceedings may be helpful.
Where, as a matter of law, a tribunal has no jurisdiction, the defect may
be urged in any of the actions or procedures discussed: appeal, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, habeas corpus, or injunction. If the existence of a jurisdictional fact is challenged, appeal and
certiorari are the most appropriate remedies. But injunction has provided relief in some instances, and quo warranto is probably available
in certain special circumstances. In cases of detention for insanity
habeas corpus is used to try a jurisdictional fact. Prohibition is ineffectual where an administrative tribunal is empowered to decide its
own jurisdiction on a conflict of evidence, and the same is true of mandamus. As to the factual merits of an administrative determination,
appeal or certiorari is a proper means for securing judicial review.
Quo warranto is available in election contests and possibly in cases of
removal from office. In tax cases involving constructive fraud the
factual merits are examined into in a suit for injunction. The evidence
and facts are not reviewed in mandamus, habeas corpus, or prohibition
actions. The legal merits of an administrative determination are most
properly subject to review in appeal or certiorari proceedings. But they
have been examined into in injunction cases under the doctrine of constructive fraud and in mandamus cases involving civil service rights.
In quo warranto legal questions are decided in election cases and possibly in cases of removal from office. Such questions are not reviewed
in prohibition or habeas corpus.
Of all the writs and procedures statutory appeal is the most satisfactory remedy to one aggrieved by an administrative determination.
Usually a trial de novo is afforded, and all questions, legal or factual,
jurisdictional or on the merits, may be tried. In certiorari no trial
anew is had, but the entire record is subject to review. Under statutory
certiorari the superior court is authorized to reverse a finding of fact
if it is unsupported by evidence or is against the preponderance of
proof. Inquiry may be made into all questions, on the merits or otherwise, as in most statutory appeals. A limitation on the usefulness of
certiorari and statutory appeal is that they are available only as to
determinations of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Quo warranto is
employed for a special purpose: to remedy usurpation of or intrusion
into an office. The statute indicates that all questions may be tried,
and this has certainly been true in election cases. The general rule is
that neither injunction nor mandamus is available to correct errors of
law or of fact in an administrative determination. However, injunction
is available to give relief from fraud, arbitrary or capricious conduct,
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or proceedings void for want of jurisdiction. The constructive fraud
doctrine has resulted in extensive review of the facts and law entering
into the merits of a tax determination. To a less extent, the same may
be said of the jurisdictional fact doctrine. Mandamus ordinarily issues
only where an official is under a statutory or constitutional duty to do
a particular act and has no discretion or power of adjudication. But in
civil service cases it appears that mandamus may sometimes issue to
correct an error of law in an administrative determination. Thus, injunction and mandamus encroach upon the functions of statutory appeal
and certiorari. Habeas corpus provides a remedy for detention under
a void proceeding but does not usually afford review on the merits.
Under prohibition the basis for relief is very narrow. Only if a tribunal
has no jurisdiction as a matter of law will the writ issue. The merits
will not be inquired into, nor will the evidence supporting a finding
of jurisdictional fact. Mandamus, injunction, habeas corpus, quo warranto and prohibition (statutory) may be granted against officers and
tribunals exercising either judicial or non-judicial powers. In passing,
the observation may be made that the extent of review depends in some
measure on the character of the tribunal and of the interests involved.
This fact sometimes causes difficulty in ascertaining what is the normal
scope of inquiry under a writ.
Differences exist among the extraordinary writs as to the time when
they may be instituted, as to procedural and substantive requirements,
as to the extent of judicial review, and as to the specific remedy which'
will be applied. No doubt lawyers have made errors in choosing the
appropriate proceeding, and the thought may occur that the writs
should be simplified and unified. Perhaps a single writ to review administrative action would accomplish this. If the facts alleged and proved
constitute a cause of action, the relief requested should be granted if it'
fits the occasion and the time is proper. The need for reform is probably not pressing because the functions of the various writs and proceedings are fairly clear. The Washington court has been reasonably
liberal in granting proper relief where the proof warranted it, and in
fitting the remedy sought to the facts at hand.'
The conclusion must be that there are ample procedures in Washing-,
ton to secure judicial review of administrative acts and determinations.
Illustrations of all types of administrative abuse and error may be found
in the decisions and judicial relief of one sort or another is invariably
available. For the main part, the Washington Supreme Court 'has recognized that administrative processes, to be effective, must not be hampered at every step and for any reason by judicial intervention. But
the court has been on the liberal side in permitting use of the extraordinary writs and procedures where good cause appears.

